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Abstract 
This paper investigates the relation between stock market sentiment and firms’ propensity to 
pay dividends in the MENA region for the period 2000- 2015. Using conventional 
determinants of cash distributions as control variables, our results show that the tendency to 
pay dividends is negatively related to the aggregate investors’ sentiment but positively related 
to the dividend premium. Unlike prior literature, we report no association between firms’ 
dividend policy and issues of stock market liquidity. Overall, we suggest that corporate 
payout policies in the case of the MENA region can best be explained by the dividend 
catering hypothesis. 
 
JEL classification: G35; G32 




























 Since the seminal papers in the dividend theory of the late-50s and early-60s (Lintner, 
1956; Miller and Modigliani, 1961) there has been, and still is, a considerable debate among 
researchers on the main drivers that motivate companies to distribute profits to their 
shareholders. One of the most interesting insights is the dividend-catering hypothesis (Baker 
and Wurgler, 2004a; 2004b) which suggests that payout policy is strongly correlated with 
investors’ preferences for the dividend payout. These preferences are not stationary but rather 
continuously changing over time. Hence, corporate managers tend to satisfy the desires and 
preferences of investors by increasing dividend payments when the markets appear to put a 
premium on shares that engage in such activity (Baker and Wurgler, 2004a). On the contrary, 
companies tend to cut down the cash distributions to their shareholders when the latter put a 
discount on such stocks. As Baker and Wurgler (2004b) argue, investors demand for cash 
distributions could be the main determinant of firms’ propensity to distributing cash profits 
after controlling for the various firms’ micro-characteristics. Nonetheless, not all studies are 
supportive of this view. Savov and Weber (2006) show that there is a key weakness in the 
dividend catering model mostly attributed to the selection of the dividend premium as a key 
explanatory factor given that the same variable can be a proxy of potential growth 
opportunities in these firms. This criticism agrees with the evidence reached in the study by 
Fama and French (2001), who found that growth opportunities
1
 for companies that never pay 
cash dividends are relatively higher than those of their non-dividend paying counterparts.  
 Furthermore, Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) showed that dividend premiums tend to 
capture the difference between the level of business risk of dividend- and non-dividend 
payers. This is further corroborated by Kuo et al. (2013) in their cross-country investigation 
using a sample of firm-level data from 18 countries around the world. As the latter authors 
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 As captured by the use of the book to market indicator (B/MV). 
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concluded, the relationship between the catering incentive variable (the aggregate premium 
on dividend-paying stocks) and the annual change in the percentage of companies that pay 
cash dividends reflects the reward offered by these companies to securities market in light of 
the level of business risk that a company faces.
2
  
 On the demand-side, it appears that dividend payments are closely linked to aspects of 
market sentiment and aggregate market performance with a number of studies showing that 
the firms’ propensity to pay  cash dividends to their shareholders is influenced by individual 
shareholders’ preferences, where such preferences have been time-inconsistent and inversely 
related to the state of market activity, i.e. individual investors preferring to receive dividends 
more in declining markets and vice versa (Fuller and Goldstein, 2011; Konieczka and 
Szyszka, 2013).  
 Although a plethora of alternative hypotheses exist, most of the prior literature 
concentrates on the developed markets with only a handful of studies focusing on the catering 
incentive hypothesis on emerging ones (Denis and Osobov, 2008; Hoberg and Prabhala, 
2009; Kuo et al., 2013; Tangjitprom, 2013; Ramadan, 2015). Our current research addresses 
this important gap in the literature by examining companies’ propensity to distribute 
dividends in the MENA region in line with Fuller and Goldstein’s (2011) proposition on the 
link between dividend premiums and aggregate market activity, i.e. individual investors 
prefer to receive dividends more in the declining markets. We test whether or not this 
argument is valid for the case of Middle East capital markets. This is especially important for 
the period subsequent to the Arabic spring revolution which is strongly characterised by a 
significant deterioration in economic activity and stock market performance. Furthermore, the 
                                                          
2
 These studies generally contradict prior findings showing that dividend premiums can be used as a proxy of 
investors’ demand for cash payments. For example, Bulan et al. (2007) shows a positive and statistically 
significant association between dividend premiums and firms’ tendency to initiate cash dividends after 
controlling for business risk. 
5 
 
lack of informational efficiency in such markets
3
 makes a really interesting case to study, as 
we believe that the prevailing market sentiment probably shows as an influential factor on 
dividend payout decisions for listed companies in these countries, as opposed to the rest of 
the alternative hypotheses proposed in the literature primarily focusing on the developed 
markets. As such, there are important implications regarding international portfolio allocation 
decisions such as investment timing decisions for emerging markets value funds and ETFs, as 
well as significant policy implications for the companies’ decisions on the dividend policy 
itself.  
 Hence, the contribution of this study is threefold. First and in line with the existing 
criticism on the use of dividend premium as a proxy for companies’ propensity to pay 
dividends, we develop a composite sentiment index for each of the MENA member countries 
relying on a variety of market indicators. We then investigate whether or not firms in the 
MENA region respond more positively to investor’s preferences for dividend payments 
during bearish markets, as proxied by the market sentiment index, and vice versa. To limits of 
our knowledge, this research represents the first attempt in exploring the potential impact of 
prevailing sentiment in the context of dividend policy on emerging markets. Second, we 
investigate the link between sentiment index and firms’ abnormal returns under conditions of 
high (low) propensity for dividends’ distribution using a firm-matching approach. Third, 
consistent with the argument that the payout decision is inversely associated with stock 
liquidity levels (Banerjee et al., 2007; Igan et al., 2010; Kuo et al., 2013) we investigate the 
possibility of such relationship being present in cases of high (low) market sentiment.  
 In brief, our results show that the tendency to distribute dividends in the MENA 
region is positively associated with the overall premium on shares that pay cash distributions 
as proposed in the dividend-catering theory even after controlling for firm’s micro 
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 As documented in prior literature, for example Omran and Farrar (2006); Lagoarde-Segot and Lucy (2008) and 




characteristics. Moreover, unlike prior literature on dividend policy, we show that stock 
liquidity is insignificantly related to the companies’ propensity to pay cash distributions in 
the Middle East region. In addition, the tendency to distribute dividends is inversely related to 
the prevailing market sentiment. Finally, in terms of stock market returns, dividend payers 
tend to outperform non-dividend payers during pessimistic sentiment periods (and vice 
versa), while the relative excess returns (dividend-payers’ stock returns minus non-payers’ 
stock returns) tends to increase in the subsequent years after the period of positive sentiment, 
and vice versa, the relative excess returns tends to decrease in the subsequent years after the 
period of negative sentiment.  
The rest of this research is structured as follows. The next section, section 2 provides an 
overview of the key theoretical explanations for the declining propensity of companies to pay 
cash distributions to their shareholders. Section 3 describes our testable hypotheses. Section 4 
introduces our data and methodology. Section 5 presents and discusses our empirical results. 
Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 The declining inclination to distribute dividends has represented a clear phenomenon 
and an unresolved issue in the academic literature for almost two decades.  In their seminal 
study, Fama and French (2001) show that the percentage of the NYSE companies that pay 
cash distributions had declined significantly during the period 1978 to 1999. Since then, 
numerous studies tried to provide interpretation to this unresolved issue. One of the earliest 
attempts that explored the dividend disappearance phenomenon in the US, a study conducted 
by DeAngelo et al. (2004), found that, on the aggregate level, dividend payments for some of 
the largest companies in the DJIA have increased as opposed to the vast number of smaller 
firms that delivered smaller dividend payments over time. Their study also showed that 
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dividend payment is negatively associated with the growth prospects, while it was positively 
associated with the firm profitability. Their results raised further doubts about the validity of 
the informational content hypothesis of dividends (Bhattacharya, 1979; John and Williams, 
1985; Miller and Rock, 1985; Denis et al., 1994) and were more in line with the dividend life-
cycle theory (Grullon et al., 2002).  Hence, companies in early periods of the life-cycle (start-
ups) tend to distribute fewer profits or no profits at all as investment opportunities exceed 
their internally-generated funds. Conversely, once those firms reach the maturity phase, they 
will tend to supply more cash distributions to their stockholders in order to reduce surplus 
funds misuse arising from the absence of suitable and adequate positive-NPV investment 
opportunities.
4
 This is further corroborated in a follow-up study (DeAngelo et al., 2006) that 




 Baker and Wurgler (2004b) provided a different interpretation of the observed decline 
in the tendency to distribute profits. Their study suggested that the appearance and 
disappearance of dividends can be interpreted by the influence of a catering incentive. Hence, 
corporate managers tend to accommodate the prevailing demand of investors for receiving 
cash distribution, especially when those investors put a premium on those shares that 
distribute profits. On the contrary, firms tend to reduce or ignore dividend payment altogether 
when investors’ preference for shares that do not distribute profits is increased. This 
hypothesis was further corroborated and extended by Li and Lie (2006) that showed a 
significant relationship between (i) the stock market’s reaction to the declarations of cash 
dividends and (ii) the dividend level with the magnitude of the dividend premium.  
                                                          
4
 This is in line with agency cost theory and the overinvestment hypothesis (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen 
et al., 1992). At the empirical level, the overinvestment hypothesis is tested by Lang and Litzenberger (1989) 
who report that the abnormal returns around announcements of regular dividend increases are positively related 
to a firm’s potential to overinvest. Nonetheless, Denis et al. (1994) and Yoon and Starks (1995) find that this 
relation is rather spurious. 
5
 Retained earnings over equity capital has used by the authors as a measure of the firm life cycle.  
8 
 
 Two other possible explanations regarding firms’ choice on dividend policy are 
related to the issues of market liquidity and risk (systematic and unsystematic). According to 
Banerjee et al. (2007), low levels of market liquidity result in high transaction costs. Under 
such market imperfections, investors will prefer to receive cash dividends rather than sell 
their stocks. Their study confirmed this explanation by showing that US companies tend to 
initiate cash dividends during periods of low market liquidity and vice versa. This 
explanation is further supported by Bulan et al. (2007) who report a negative relation between 
cash dividends’ initiation and stock turnover ratio (a proxy for market liquidity) for the US. 
Prior studies reported a similar picture with regards to the role of systematic and unsystematic 
risk (Grullon et al., 2002; Hoberg and Prabhala, 2009; Kuo et al., 2013). This is because firms 
that have a high level of idiosyncratic risk and high earnings’ fluctuation tend to pay a fewer 
amount of available profits in form of cash distributions and maximise their cash reserves for 
the years to come.  
 Despite the numerous theoretical explanations proposed in the literature evidence at 
the empirical level, especially outside the US, is rather mixed. Denis and Osobov (2008) 
provide evidence supportive to the agency cost theory over the dividend catering theory in 
their study of five developed markets. Their results suggest that the disappearance of cash 
distributions is a prevailing trend globally and that certain micro-characteristics such as the 
firms’ size, profitability, available investment opportunities, and the RE/TE ratio are 
statistically significant determinants of this phenomenon. On the contrary, in their 
investigation on cash distributions and shares buybacks for Canada, Baker et al. (2012) show 
that Canadian companies have the tendency to increase the supply of cash dividends when a 
dividend premium exists on their shares, as suggested by the catering incentive explanation.  
 With regards to the emerging markets, prior studies on the determinant of dividend 
policy also portrayed a similar picture. For example, Ferris et al. (2009) show that the 
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declining propensity to dividend payments is not restricted only to the US market, but also 
across the globe, mostly driven by an increasing percentage of companies that do not pay 
cash distributions to their stockholders at all.
6
 This is further corroborated by Reddy and Rath 
(2005) who show that the aggregate supply of dividends in the Indian market is mostly 
delivered by the largest and most profitable companies, evidence consistent with the firm life-
cycle theory of dividends (Grullon et al., 2002). These findings are supported by subsequent 
authors (Kumar, 2006; Saravanakumar, 2011; Labhane and Mahakud, 2016).  
 On the contrary, studies on the countries of the MENA region are quite limited and 
rather inconclusive. Using a sample of Jordanian firms, Hamill and Al-Shattarat (2012) show 
that ownership structure (insiders vis-à-vis outside institutional shareholders) is a significant 
determinant of firms’ dividend payment ratio, a finding in line with the agency cost 
hypothesis. On the contrary, Ramadan (2015) suggests that Jordanian companies tend to alter 
their dividend policies, according to investors’ preferences for cash distribution, consistent 
with the dividend catering perspective. Furthermore, Farooq et al. (2017) report a positive 
association between dividend payments and the earnings-returns ratio providing further 
support to DeAngelo et al.’s (2006) argument that dividend decisions can be used as a tool to 
minimise agency conflicts. Recently, Hamouda (2018) examines share repurchases in light of 
the political instability in the MENA region using a  sample of  1510 share repurchase events 
from all ten countries in the region (Bahrain, Egypt, Isreal, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia). Complementary to that study, we also confirm that the use 




 We extend this line of enquiry by assessing whether or not companies’ dividend 
policy in the MENA region is driven by (i) the association between the composite sentiment 
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 In this study, the authors explore the pattern of dividend payments over the period 1994-2007 using a sample 
of 9 common law and 16 civil law stock markets.  
7
 Our sample of cash dividends is 5072 compared to 1510 observation for the case of share repurchases. 
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index and the excess stock returns of such firms (dividend catering hypothesis), (ii) stock 
liquidity (stock liquidity hypothesis), and (iii) positive and negative market sentiments.  We 
continue with the formulation of our testable hypotheses.  
 
3. Development of hypotheses 
 According to the classical perspective for payout policy (Miller and Modigliani, 
1961), stock values are not influenced by firms’ decision to pay the cash dividends. However, 
prior empirical evidence refutes that claim.  For example, in a seminal study by Long (1978) 
the author demonstrates significant preference by individual investors for cash dividends over 
stock dividends even though the cash distributions are subject to higher tax treatment in the 
United States. Most of these earlier studies on the link between dividend policy and corporate 
value stemmed from the asset pricing literature. For example, Black and Scholes (1974) 
argue that the dividend yield is not an appropriate measure for determining the required rate 
of return in the context of asset pricing theory; while, Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1982) 
find that stocks with higher dividend yields tend to require a higher rate of return. Poterba 
(1986) reports higher stock market returns around the ex-dividend date for those firms that 
pay stock dividends as opposed to cash dividends (13.9% and 12.4% respectively) indicating 
a continuous shift of investors’ preferences between capital gains and income from period to 
period.
8
 Moreover, Julio and Ikenberry (2004) report higher cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) for dividend payers on the dividend announcement date. Nonetheless, once these 
CARs are adjusted for a firm’s size and age they become insignificant. As the authors 
suggest, these findings are in line with the “free cash flow” hypothesis and the need for the 
majority of mature firms to re-assure investors that resources are not wasted on value-
destroying investments.  
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 Poterba’s (1986) findings contradict those of Long (1978). 
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On the contrary, other studies are supportive of the catering explanation. Li and Lie (2006) 
show that the abnormal stock returns during the 3-day window around the dividend 
announcements are positively related to both the dividend premium and the dividend yield. 
These findings are corroborated by later studies (Bulan et al., 2007;  Kale et al., 2012) that 
report significantly positive CARs around dividend initiation dates for firms with higher 
dividend premiums and dividend yields, even after controlling for firm-specific factors, such 
as growth rate and investment policy. 
The subsequent literature further supports the view that investors are not indifferent to the 
choice between cash dividends and capital gains with many instances where shareholders 
have a clear inclination for preferring cash distributions over other forms of corporate payout. 
Consistent with the prior evidence, Baker and Wurgler (2004a,b) provide evidence that 
supports the idea that investors’ demand for dividends (measured by dividend premium) not 
only affects companies’ decision to pay cash distributions but also future stock market returns 
of these firms (dividend payers and non-payers). The propensity to pay cash distributions is 
also found to be positively related to the dividend premium, while future returns for dividend 
payers and non-payers are negatively related to the lagged dividend premium.   
 Fuller and Goldstein (2011) further suggest that cash distributions are related to stock 
market movements and appear to be very important for shareholders, especially during 
periods of bearish markets. Their results indicate that stock market returns of dividend-payers 
outperformed those of non-payers by approximately 1% to 2% during periods of declining 
markets (and vice versa). Hence, in line with the aforementioned studies, we examine the 
potential influence of investors’ sentiment on the relative returns of the two groups (dividend 




H1a: “Abnormal returns are higher (lower) for dividend-paying stocks when investor 
sentiment is low (high)”,  
 
H1b: “Abnormal returns are lower (higher) for non-dividend paying stocks when investor 
sentiment is high (low)”. 
 
 In this paper, we also investigate the timing of dividend payments. Bulan et al. (2007) 
suggest that US companies have the tendency to initiate dividends during periods 
accompanied by high levels of dividends premium, even after controlling for idiosyncratic 
risk. Using a hazard regression model, they show that firms that have similar internal 
characteristics, i.e. high levels of dividends premium, have a higher propensity to pay cash 
dividends to their stockholders. In contrast to the catering hypothesis suggested by Baker and 
Wurgler (2004a, b), Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) argue that the dividends premium plays an 
important role in explaining the dividend disappearance phenomenon in the absence of 
business risk. Once they controlled for business risk the explanatory power of the dividends 
premium vanishes. In addition, they report a positive relationship between future returns for 
dividend payers and dividends premium. Furthermore, Kale et al. (2012) suggest that firms 
suffering from lower levels of stock liquidity are less inclined to initiate dividends. Their 
study shows that dividend initiation announcements are positively related to abnormal returns 
during the period of the announcement. This indicates a positive investors’ reaction toward 
dividend initiation and reflects their preference to receive cash distributions, as opposed to 
other forms of corporate payout policy. More recently, Neves (2018) tests the dividend 
catering hypothesis using a European sample consisting of 635 companies from 12 Eurozone 
countries and reports a positive relationship between the dividend payment ratio and the 
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dividends premium used as a proxy for investor sentiment. These results are economically 
and statistically significant even after controlling for firms’ micro characteristics.  
 
In line with the aforementioned studies, we test the following hypothesis 
H2: “There is a positive relationship between the propensity to distribute profits and investor 
demand for dividends (dividend premium) in the MENA capital markets”. 
 
 Another important factor that determines firms’ propensity to distribute dividends to 
their stockholders is the level of market liquidity. Prior studies suggested that stock liquidity 
and the cash dividends are inversely related. For example, Banerjee et al. (2007) propose that 
the declining propensity of US companies to pay cash distributions can be explained by the 
increase of market liquidity. Depending on the prevailing market conditions (positive or 
negative market sentiment), firms tend to respond to investors’ preferences for liquidity by 
altering their dividend policy to meet those needs for increased liquidity. This is further 
corroborated by Igan et al. (2010) who show that the payment of cash dividends is positively 
associated with stock liquidity levels, especially for those firms with high levels of 
institutional ownership.
9
 In line with these studies, we also test the link between market 
liquidity and firms’ propensity to distribute dividends. We suggest that during periods of 
negative (positive) market sentiment, stock liquidity
10
 of dividend-payers will be higher 
(lower) than that of their non-dividend-payers counterparts. Hence, we test the following 
hypothesis  
H3:“There is a negative relationship between the firms’ propensity to pay dividends and the 
level of stock liquidity in the MENA capital markets”. 
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 According to Igan et al. (2010), the presence of a large number of institutional investors can be a reliable 
proxy for large shareholder power and increased levels of managerial monitoring. 
10
 As proxied by the stock turnover ratio. 
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 Lastly, Baker and Wurgler (2004a,b) suggest that corporate manager rationally caters 
to investor’s desire for liquidity by paying cash dividends during periods of economic 
recession. As such, investors seeking safety are more inclined to hold dividend-paying stocks 
during such periods, while they prefer to invest in the non-paying stocks mostly during times 
of economic recovery and/or expansion. In line with this argument, our final hypothesis 
builds on the idea that corporate management will be more inclined to pay dividends during 
periods of negative sentiment and vice versa. Hence, our last testable hypothesis is the 
following:  
H4:“There is a negative relationship between firms’ propensity to distribute cash to their 
shareholders in the form of dividend payments and the aggregate investors’ sentiment in the 
MENA region”. 
 
4. Data and methodology 
4.1.Data 
 Our data includes the entire population of publicly-listed companies for the period 
2000-2015 in the stock markets of all countries that are part of the MENA region, namely 
Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and UAE. 
All data are obtained from Datastream (TDS) and Bloomberg databases including firms that 
are currently active and those that have become de-listed during the sample period. Hence, 
our analysis is free from survivorship bias. In line with prior studies (Hoberg and Prabhala, 
2009; Tangjitprom, 2013; Jabbouri, 2016), we exclude all financial stocks due to the 
significant difference in their accounting items. The criterion that was used for sample 
selection stipulates that a company should have a complete set of observations for each 
calendar year for the following accounting and financial items (mnemonics): total assets 
(WC02999), stock price (P), common shares outstanding (WC05301), earnings before 
15 
 
interest and taxes (EBIT) (WC18191), book value of equity (WC05491), cash balance 
(WC02003), total debts (WC03255), total cash dividends (WC04551), retained earnings 
(WC03495), retained earnings-to-equity ratio (RE/TE) (WC08911)  and trading volume 
(VO). Total assets (WC02999) must be available for both financial periods t (dividend 
payment period) and t -1 (one year prior), while all other items should be available for period 
t. All data related to the firm’s micro-characteristics are collected annually, whereas market-
related data are collected monthly. Our final sample consists of 580 firms corresponding to 
9280 firm-years.  
 The selection of these variables is based on previous evidence in the field. For 
example, firms’ size is considered as one of the key variables that have been put forward by 
prior studies as a key determinant of corporates’ payout policy (Fama and French, 2001; Al-
Malkawi, 2007; Denis and Osobov, 2008). This is because larger firms are more inclined to 
distribute a higher proportion of their profits to their shareholders in the form of dividend 
payments whereas small-size firms tend not to distribute any dividends at all due to their 
increased difficulty and higher costs in raising capital through external financing.
11
 Extant 
literature also reports that dividend payment decision is positively associated with firm 
profitability. This is due to the idea that companies with stable earnings prefer to distribute 
part of these profits to their shareholders and increase their dividend levels (Li and Lie, 2006; 
Tangjitprom, 2013; Jabbouri, 2016). The use of the EBIT accounting indicator (WC18191) 
allows us to test for such a hypothesis. The impact of available growth opportunities for these 
firms is another key variable that determines firms’ dividend policy. According to Rozeff 
(1982), firms are keener to utilise internal capital for financing any investment opportunities 
so as to avoid unnecessary transaction costs that are directly related to the use of external 
financing. Hence, investment opportunities should be inversely associated with the dividend 
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ratio (e.g. Fama and French, 2001; Ferris et al., 2006). Furthermore, total debts (WC03255) 
and cash (WC02003) are also found to be significant determinants of corporate payout policy 
and are both used in our study. As prior literature suggests, debt and dividend policies are 
used interchangeably as means to solve agency problems, when there is an expected 
relationship between the debt ratio and payment of cash dividends (Grossman and Hart, 1980; 
Jensen, 1986; La Porta et al., 2000; Farooq and Jabbouri, 2015). This is particularly true for 
the case of emerging markets where the presence of market frictions (i.e. thin trading and low 
liquidity) can dramatically increase the cost of external financing.
12
 On the contrary, we use 
cash balance as a proxy of internal liquidity, in line with prior evidence that reports a 




In Figure 1, we highlight the proportion of dividend payers in the MENA region during the 
period 2000 to 2015. The figure shows that the percentage of dividend payers in these ten 
Arabian countries decreases significantly from about 45% in 2000 to 35.9% in 2004. On the 
contrary, in the period 2005-2011 the percentage of dividend payers increased sharply 
reaching a maximum level of 69% by 2009 before decreasing slightly to 59% in the year 
2011. Following the 2011 Arab spring movement in Egypt, the proportion of dividend payers 
started to consistently increase reaching the 70% of all listed companies by 2015. 
(Insert Figure 1 about here) 
 
 Table 1 shows the total number of firms used in our study for each of the ten countries 
located in the MENA region and for the period 2000-2015. The table indicates that the 
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 In a study by Aivazian et al. (2003), the authors report a negative relationship between fims’ debt ratios and 
the level of dividend payments in 8 emerging markets (Korea, India, Malaysia, Thailand, Zimbabwe, Jordan, 
Pakistan and Turkey). This result is also corroborated by Kisman (2013) in his study of dividend policy for the 
Indonesian companies. 
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 Neveretheless, a few studies in emerging markets also report a positive but insignificant relationship between 
these two variables (Mehta, 2012; Kisman, 2013).  
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percentage of companies that distribute profits varies considerably amongst those countries. 
The highest percentage of the companies that pay dividends exists in Oman, Qatar and 
Bahrain. On the contrary, companies listed in UAE, Morocco, and Tunisia are found to be the 
least possible to supply dividends to their shareholders. In terms of firms’ size of these firms, 
companies in Egypt and Saudi Arabia appear to be the largest ones (5.84 and 5.76); while 
those in Tunisia and Jordan the smallest (4.35 and 4.88 respectively). Most profitable firms 
are those listed in Qatar and Bahrain while regarding future growth opportunities we find the 
firms located in Bahrain, Jordan, and Qatar tend to have growth opportunities that exceed 
those in other countries (0.14, 0.15 and 0.15).  
 In terms of corporate leverage, we observe a uniform pattern in the average debt 
indicators across all countries, although the highest levels of corporate debt are observed in 
the cases of Egypt and Saudi Arabia (0.48 and 0.44 respectively).  Finally, with regards to 
internal liquidity, the results indicate that listed firms in the UAE and Kuwait tend to be the 
ones with the highest liquidity as compared to the rest of the companies in the MENA region. 
In Table 2, we further report relevant summary statistics between firms that distribute profits 
and those that do not. As these results show, companies that pay cash dividends are generally 
larger in size, more profitable, have fewer growth opportunities, higher debt and are more 
liquid. These findings are in line with prior literature (Fama and French, 2001; Ho, 2003; 
Ferris et al., 2006; Denis and Osobov, 2008). For example, in the emerging markets’ 
literature, recent studies show that management of large companies in Indonesia and Jordan 
prefer to pay cash distributions to their shareholders than that of the smaller size-decile firms 
(Kisman, 2013; Ramadan, 2015). Moreover, our results corroborate the findings of Mehta 
(2012) and Jabbouri (2016) which show that Arab firms that tend to distribute profits 
typically are more profitable (Mehta, 2012; Jabbouri, 2016). Arguably, one of the most 
possible interpretations of the foregoing evidence is that such companies (dividend payers) 
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typically suffer from lack of available growth opportunities; hence, their large internal 
liquidity allows them the possibility of paying cash dividends. 
(Insert table 1 and 2 about here) 
 Table 3 presents the outcomes of Pearson correlation matrix for the independent 
variables that we used in the current study. The matrix shows that the correlation between the 
investor sentiment (IS) and the dividend premium (DP) is too low. Specifically, the negative 
correlation between investor sentiment and dividend premium is about 3% indicating that the 
investor sentiment index captures the current investors’ attitude which does not appear in the 
dividend premium. In addition, the correlation matrix indicates that there is a positive 
correlation between the stock liquidity and investors’ sentiment, although this is still low 
(approx. 29%).  
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
 
4.2. Modelling approach and definition of variables 
 Our first explanatory variable is the dividend premium. We calculated the dividend 
premium in line with Baker and Wurgler (2004) as the difference of the log of the average 
value-weighted market-to-book ratio (M/BV) between companies that pay dividends and 










n BV n BV 
      
       
            
       (1) 
where,  𝐷𝑃𝑡 is the dividend premium in year t; 
( )
it
M  is the market value of firm i in year t; 
( )
it
BV  is the book value of firm i in year t ; while d and nd stand for dividend and non-
dividend payers. All values had been weighted by the book value of assets in line with Baker 
and Wurgler (2004).  
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 Table 4 presents the aggregate value-weighted market to book ratios for both groups 
of companies (dividend payers and non-dividend payers). All values of the M/BV ratios are 
calculated according to the fiscal year-ends and for all countries in our sample. Prior 
literature has used dividend premium as a proxy for investors’ desire for dividends (Baker 
and Wurgler, 2004a,b; Li and Lie, 2006; Savov and Weber, 2006; Hoberg and Prabhala, 
2009; Kale et al., 2012; Neves, 2018). Those studies overwhelmingly suggested that the 
dividend premium can be used as a reliable proxy for investors’ need for cash dividends.
14
   
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
 
 In line with prior literature for the developed markets, we also test the link between 
the companies’ propensity to pay cash distributions and stock liquidity. This allows us to 
investigate the extent to which market liquidity (or lack of) has a significant effect on payout 
decisions in the case of those emerging markets of the MENA region. Based on traditional 
finance theory we should expect such a relationship to be positive and statistically significant. 
Stock liquidity is measured using the stock turnover ratio (𝑆𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑅) in line with Amihud 
(2002) and Kuo et al. (2013). This indicator is calculated as the ratio between the number of 
traded shares (trading volume) and the total number of outstanding shares. Similarly, the 
influence of investment sentiment on the propensity of firms to distribute dividends is 
explored using the approach of Baker and Wurgler (2006) and Baker et al. (2012). Hence, in 
line with these studies, we construct a composite index for investors’ sentiment using a set of 
alternative proxies. The first variable is the volatility premium (VPit), which was defined as 
the logarithmic value of the ratio between the value-weighted
15
 average market-to-book ratio 
(M/BV) of high volatility stocks and those stocks that exhibit low volatility. This is done by 
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 There are few exceptions such as the studies by Savov and Weber (2006) and Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) 
which show that the dividend premium is a statistically insignificant proxy of investors’ attitude for dividends at 
the aggregate level.  
15
 By total market volatility. 
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sorting all our sample data country by country and then estimating the variance of the 
previous year’s monthly returns for each stock. In line with Fama and French (1993) and 
Baker et al. (2012), high (low) volatility represents one of the top (bottom) three deciles of 
the variance of the previous year's monthly returns, where all decile breakpoints are 
determined country by country. The total volatility will define as the standard deviation of 
previous year's monthly returns. All, data on stock market returns and the M/BV ratio are 
collected from the Datastream. Our second and third proxies are (i) the number of initial 
public offerings (NIPO) defined as the log of total numbers of IPOs, and (ii) the initial 
average returns on those IPO activities (RIPO) calculated as the average returns (difference 
between offering price and closing price) on the first day of the IPOs. All data for IPOs in the 
MENA region are collected from Bloomberg.  
 The last two variables used are the market liquidity (STURN) which is defined as the 
number of traded shares over the number of outstanding shares, and the dividend premium 
describes with Eq.1. To eliminate information that may be contained on those proxy variables 
which are not associated with stock market sentiment but to wider economic fundamentals 
we follow the Baker and Wurgler (2006) approach and regress each sentiment proxy on a set 
of macroeconomic indicators; namely, the consumption growth rate, the industrial production 
growth rate, the employment growth rate, inflation rate, and the short-term interest rate.  
 The whole process of constructing the sentiment index is accomplished by employing 
a principal component analysis (PCA) that helps us to estimate the composite index based on 
the common component within the aforementioned five proxies. We define ISt as the first 
principal component of these five variables and we then obtain the first sentiment index by 
regressing each sentiment proxy to the macroeconomic variables mentioned above in order to 





t t t t
t t
IS DP STURN NIPO
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   
 
    (2) 
 Consistent with the extant literature, our explanatory variables control for various firm 
micro-characteristics. Specifically, we included the log of the total assets as a measure of 
firms’ size (SZit). Profitability (PROFit) is measured as a percentage of the earnings before the 
interest and taxes (EBIT) over the firm’s total assets. As a proxy for growth opportunities 
(GOit) we use the percentage of change in assets, while short-term liquidity is captured by the 
use of the cash ratio (CASRit) estimated as cash balance over the total value of assets. Finally, 




 The propensity of MENA firms to distribute profits in the form of dividends is 
estimated using the modelling approach introduced by Fama and French (2001) calculated as 
the difference between the actual percentage of dividend payers and the expected percentage 
of dividend payers (
itPTP ) during each year of our sample period 2000 - 2015. The latter is 
estimated using a logit model that employs various firm micro characteristics as independent 
variables mathematically defined as: 
1 2 3 4 5it t it it it it it itPTP a b SZ b PROF b GO b TDR b CASR          (3) 
Where, 
itPTP is a binary variable for the likelihood of a firm i paying dividend (1 for dividend 
payers, 0 otherwise) at year t. All independent variables are defined previously.  
 
Figure 2 shows the change in propensity to pay dividends over time, a clear decline in the 
propensity to pay dividends is observed between 2002 and 2008, while the trend line of 
propensity to pay dividends start to take the opposite shape from 2009 until 2015. 
(Insert Figure 2 about here) 
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 All variables and expected signs are presented in Appendix A. 
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Table 5 compares firms’ actual versus expected percentage to pay cash distributions from 
2000 to 2015. We initially estimate the expected propensity to distribute profits for each firm 
individually and for each year under examination, then we obtain the expected percentage by 
computing the average propensity to distribute profits across firms year by year. According to 
our results, the percentage of companies that pay cash distributions in the MENA region 
increases from 45.9% in 2000 to 73.7% in 2015. This is a stark contrast to the results reported 
for the UK and the US. For example, Ferris et al. (2006) found that the percentage of 
dividend payers has declined in the UK from 75.9 percent in 1988 to 54.4 percent in 2002. 
However, this proportion of UK dividend payers is still large compared with the US market 
which has experienced a clear decrease in the proportion of firms that pay cash dividends 
(about 20.8 percent) as reported in Fama and French (2001). It is our view that such a large 
difference in corporate payout policies is mainly attributable to the impact of tax exemption 
on cash dividends which is a key characteristic of most stock markets in the MENA region. 
We think that the tax exemption is one of the main reasons that lead MENA corporations to 
distribute funds back to their shareholders iin the form of dividend payment as 8 countries 
from our sample set tend to provide relevant tax exemptions to dividend payment (Kuwait, 
Jordan, Oman, Qatar, UAE, Egypt, Bahrain, and also Morocco exempt dividends from tax 
treatment for local investors); while, dividend payments in Saudi Arabia and Tunisia are 
subject to a tax bracket of 5% and 15% respectively. 
Conversely, the situation in the USA is fundamentally different with cash dividends been 
subject to tax treatment at 15% after the tax cut from the Bush government in 2003. As a 
conclusion, we suggest that the phenomenon of dividend disappearance before 2000 in the 
US stock markets could be attributed to tax considerations
17
 motivating US companies to 
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 The tax bracket on dividend payout was about 38.1%. 
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switch to shares buybacks in the last two decades as a substitute to cash dividends (Julio and 
Ikenberry, 2004).     
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
To investigate the extent to which the sentiment index can explain the return differential 
between dividend and non-dividend payers we run the following regression  
1 1
d nd
jt jt t jtAR AR a IS          (4) 
where, djtAR  is the abnormal returns on dividend-paying stocks at time t; 
nd
jtAR is the abnormal 
returns on non-dividend paying stocks at time t; and 𝐼𝑆𝑡−1 is the lagged investor sentiment 
index. Abnormal stock returns are calculated as the difference between actual and expected 
monthly returns for security i at time t using the market model.   
 Furthermore, to assess the impact of the market sentiment alongside the current firm 
micro characteristics on companies' propensity to pay dividends we use the following logistic 
regression 
1 2 3 4
5 6 1 7 1 8 1
it t it it it it
it t it t it
PTP a b SZ b PROF b GO b TDR
b CASR b DP b STURN b IS   
    
    
    (5) 
where, 
itPTP  is a binary variable equal to 1 for all firms that distribute profits at time t (0 
otherwise); all firms’ micro characteristics (size, profitability, growth opportunities, total debt 
ratio, cash ratio) are defined previously; 
1tDP is the lagged dividend premium; 1itSTURN  is 
the lagged stock turnover; and 
1tIS  is the lagged composite sentiment index. It should be 
noted that the use of lagged variables (dividend premium, stock liquidity, and investor 
sentiment index) allows better prediction of possible changes in the firms’ propensity to pay 




               Lastly, in order to investigate the year- and country- fixed effects, we use a panel 
fixed regression model that allows us to include the year name and the country name as 
dummy variables in our analysis. In addition, in line with De Angelo et al. (2006) we test the 
effect of a firm’s maturity on dividend payout by adding two life-cycle proxies (RE/TE and 
TE/TA). We also proxy the volatility of cash flows, measured by the standard deviation of 
operating profitability, as a substitute to risk factor in line with Chay and Suh (2009). 
 
The statistical equation of panel fixed regression is formulated as follows: 




          + 𝛽7
𝑇𝐸
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽8𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽9𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽10𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 +  𝛽11𝐼𝑆𝑡−1 +𝜆2𝐸𝐺𝑌𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌 
          + ⋯ + 𝜆9𝑈𝐴𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌 + 𝛿2𝑌2001𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌 + ⋯ + 𝛿15𝑌2015𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌 + µ𝑖𝑡                   (6) 
 
Where, 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 is dividend payout ratio measured as total dividends over operating profits, 
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡−1 is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the firm paid dividends in the last year 
and 0 otherwise, 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 is the standard deviation of the operating profits ratio and a 
proxy for cash flow volatility, 𝑅𝐸/𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 is the ratio of retained earnings over total equity, 
𝑇𝐸/𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the ratio of total equity over total assets. All other dummy variables are related to 
country and year fixed effects. 
 
5. Results discussion 
5.1.Composite sentiment index and relative returns 
Table 6 reports the results on the relationship between stock market performance and investor 
sentiment. We regress the abnormal returns for the two groups of companies on the lagged 
composite sentiment index. To do so, we divide market conditions depending on the 
sentiment index with 𝐼𝑆𝑡−1 > 0 that is considered as indicator of a bullish market (positive 
sentiment) and (𝐼𝑆𝑡−1 < 0) that is considered an indicator of a bearish market (negative 
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sentiment). Accordingly, we observe that the abnormal returns of non-dividend-payers are 
clearly outperforming the abnormal returns of dividend payers during the period of positive 
sentiment.  
(Insert Table 6 about here) 
 
In detail, we observe that an increase by one standard deviation of composite sentiment 
increases abnormal returns for non-dividend payers by 5.34 percent and decrease abnormal 
returns for dividend payers by 4.11 percent. The relative difference in excess returns of two 
groups of companies is -9.45 percent, result which is significant at 5 percent level. On the 
contrary, according to Panel B during a negative market sentiment (𝐼𝑆𝑡−1 < 0) dividend 
paying companies enjoy, on average, an abnormal return of 3.12 percent as opposed to non-
dividend payers (-2.56 percent). The overall difference in market performance between the 
two groups of firms is 5.68 percent, significant at the 5 percent level during the periods of the 
bearish market. Hence, we conclude that investors in the MENA region tend to overvalue 
dividend-paying stocks during periods of negative sentiment. This is inconsistent to the 
findings of Baker and Wurgler (2006), they showed that the returns of non-dividend-paying 
stocks tend to be higher when the investor sentiment at the beginning of the estimation period 
is negative and vice versa. On the contrary, our findings consistent with evidence reached by 
Fuller and Goldstein (2011) who found that abnormal returns for dividend payers (compared 
to non-dividend payers) during periods of a declining market. Based on these results, our first 
two hypotheses H1a and H1b are accepted.  
In Figure 3 we visually depict the time trend for the relationship between the propensity to 
pay dividends and two proxies of market sentiment (dividend premium and composite 
sentiment index). We observe that the relationship between the propensity to pay dividends 
and dividend premium is tend to be positive in majority of sample periods unless the period 
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from 2005 to 2008 where it was tends to be negative, while the association between the 
propensity to pay dividends and aggregate market sentiment tends to be negative in the period 
from 2000 to 2011 unless the period between 2011 and 2014. 
(Insert Figure 3 about here) 
 Table 7 presents the logistic regression results for the propensity to distribute profits 
for the period 2000-2015. The dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 for firms i 
that distributed profits at year t and 0 otherwise.  
(Insert Table 7 about here) 
According to Table 7, dividend-paying firms are on average larger firms, in terms of size, and 
more profitable. The coefficients for both variables are positive and statistically significant. 
For example, the coefficient for size is reported as 0.304 significant at the 1 percent level, 
while for profitability the relationship is also positive (10.991), significant at 5 percent level. 
We also report an inverse relationship between the propensity to pay cash distributions and 
growth opportunities (coefficient of -0.095 significant at 5 percent level). This is consistent 
with the life-cycle theory of dividend policy (Fama and French, 2001; De Angelo et al., 2006) 
which suggests that mature firms with low investment opportunities are more inclined to pay 
dividends. Lastly, the impact of both the debt and cash ratios appears to be statistically 
insignificant to the propensity to distribute dividends for both the full sample and the 
individual sub-samples in our analysis.  
Overall, our empirical findings overwhelmingly support the relationship between 
dividend premium and the propensity to pay cash distributions. All coefficients are found to 
be positive and statistically significant across all sub-periods under examination (1.335, 1.988 
and 1.411 respectively). This is consistent with the dividend catering hypothesis, which 
argues that firms have a tendency to respond to investors’ demand through paying cash 
distributions when the aggregate dividend premium is positive (Baker and Wurgler, 2004a,b). 
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As a result, we can conclude that the dividend premium is a reliable proxy for explaining the 
propensity to distribute profits in the Middle East as firms, on average, tend to pay dividends 
during periods that are characterised by an increase in the dividend premium.  These results 
are in line with the evidence reached in the case of the developed markets. For example, 
Baker and Wurgler (2004a,b) showed that the dividend premium is the main driver for the 
propensity to distribute profits in US companies listed in the NYSE, while Ferris et al. (2006) 
reported similar results for the UK market.
18
 Therefore, on the basis of these findings, we can 
accept hypothesis H2.  
 Further examination of the link between stock liquidity and composite sentiment 
index with the propensity to distribute profits report mixed results. For example, we report a 
positive but statistically insignificant relationship between stock liquidity and the propensity 
to distribute profits in the case of the full sample 2000-2015 and the three sub-samples. These 
results contradict prior evidence from the developed markets. Banerjee et al. (2007) found 
negative relationship between payout policy and market liquidity. As the authors argued, the 
owners of stocks with low liquidity tend to prefer receiving cash distributions and vice versa. 
Hence, US companies appear to respond to investors’ preference for liquidity in a favourable 
manner.  
 In terms of the link between firms’ propensity to pay cash distributions and the 
composite sentiment index, Table 7 reports a negative relationship after controlling for all 
firm micro characteristics. The coefficient for the entire sample period 2000-2015 appears to 
be negative (-0.250) and significant at 10 percent level. This result was reached across all 
different sub-periods. Overall, the composite sentiment index appears to explain only 29.12 
percent of the changing propensity in the full sample and about 32.71 percent, 25.19 percent, 
and 28.68 percent in the various sub-periods. Such a result implies that during periods of 
                                                          
18




negative sentiment, investors seeking safety will hold the dividend-paying stocks in their 
portfolio for too long into the future. On the contrary, during periods of positive sentiment, 
investors are more willing to tolerate risk and take long positions in the non-dividend paying 
stocks. As such, corporate managers perceive the prevailing sentiment in the stock market as 
a window of opportunity to boost the share price of their companies by initiating dividend 
payments when the prevailing sentiment is negative.  
 This finding is not unexpected but in line with results reported in Table 6 and 
consistent with the evidence reported by Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) for the US. In their 
study using three alternative proxies for market sentiment (closed-end fund discount, 
sentiment index, initiator announce index), the authors reported a negative association of the 
propensity to pay dividends with all sentiment proxies, especially with the investor sentiment 
index (𝑅2 of 27.8%) and Closed end fund discount (𝑅2of 22%).  Hence, in light of the results 
reported in our study, hypothesis H3 is rejected but hypothesis H4 is accepted.  
 
5.2. Other explanations  
According to De Angelo et al. (2004), the dividend payout behaviour in the US is 
concentrated among larger and mature firms in line with the “life-cycle” hypothesis.  In a 
subsequent study, De Angelo et al. (2006) empirically test this hypothesis using two main 
proxies for corporate life-cycle, namely (i) retained earnings-to-total equity and (ii) total 
equity-to-assets. Their study finds a positive association between the propensity to pay 
dividends and the ratio of retained earnings-to-equity indicating that firms’ life cycle could 
possibly explain the declining propensity to pay dividends among US companies. 
To address this issue, we conduct a panel-fixed effect regression analysis between the 
dividend payout ratio (total dividends over operating profits) and the set of independent 
variables discussed earlier. In addition, we incorporate relevant life-cycle proxies (RE/TE and 
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TE/TA) in line with De Angelo et al. (2006) and a measure of cash flow volatility (standard 
deviation of the operating profits ratio) in line with Chay and Suh (2009). Our lagged 
dividend payout is a binary variable equal to 1 if the firm i paid a cash dividend at t-1 and 0 
otherwise. We also control for country and year fixed effects using binary variables with the 
value of 1 when the observation occurs in country x (or year t) and 0 otherwise.  
(Insert Table 8 about here) 
Table 8 reports the results on the relationship between the dividend payout ratio with the two 
main proxies for firm life-cycle (RE/TE, TE/TA) and the market sentiment (DP, IS).  It shows 
that firms with high RE/TE ratio are more likely to provide higher dividends to their 
shareholders (coefficient of 0.0653, t-value of 2.2526). In terms of the other proxy for 
corporate life-cycle (TE/TA), the results appear to be statistically insignificant. Hence our 
findings are only partially consistent with that of De Angelo et al. (2006), who found that 
both RE/TE and TE/TA ratios are economically and statistically significant explanatory 
variables of the decision of US firms to pay dividends to their shareholders. The current 
findings are more compatible with prior studies on the developing markets. For example, El-
ansary and Gomaa (2012) provide clear evidence in support of the firm’s life-cycle 
hypothesis when testing the propensity of the Egyptian listed firms to pay dividends.  
Regarding the dividends-catering hypothesis, both coefficients for the dividend ratio and the 
dividend premium are positively related to the dividend payout ratio (0.4635 and 1.8132, t-
values of 1.7866 and 2.0761 respectively). This suggests that the Arabian firms are more 
likely to distribute a large amount of operating profits when the stock market has placed a 
premium on the shares that already paid cash dividends to their shareholders in the past. 
Conversely, we find that the dividend payout ratio is negatively related to the prevailing 
market sentiment (-0.3465, t-value of -2.1371). Such results provide clear support for both 
the corproate life cycle and the catering explanations in the case of the MENA region. 
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5.3. Dividend increases, decreases, initiations and omissions 
For many reasons, the propensity to pay dividends does not give a full image of dividend 
decisions inside the firms (Hoberg and Prabhala, 2009). To explore further dividend decision 
in the MENA region, we divide the full dataset into different sub-samples covering 1931 
firm-year observations related to dividend increases, 1482 observation for dividend 
decreases, 928 observations for dividend initiation, and 770 observations for dividend 
omission. The dependent variables in the panel-logistic analysis are the probability of 
dividend change reflecting i) the propensity to increase dividends and ii) the propensity to 
decrease dividends. Cases of initiating or omitting dividends are scarcer in our sample with 
dividend initiation capturing the first cash dividend for each firm in the available dataset and 
dividend omission the cases where a sample firm decides to cut down the cash dividends after 
paying a regular stream of cash dividends in the prior years. 
(Insert Table 9 about here) 
Table 9 reports the results of panel logistic regression analysis. The first two columns present 
the findings for both dividend increases and decreases. We restrict our analysis only on those 
firms that pay dividends at year t, while eliminating all non-dividend-payers from our data 
set. We examine the catering hypothesis alongside the life cycle hypothesis and control for 
both country and time fixed effects. Model (1) shows that firms located in the MENA region 
tend to increase their cash dividends if they are larger in size, have more profits and have 
lower growth opportunities. In regards to the firm life cycle, the coefficient for RE/TE is 
positive and statistically significant (0.0392 at the 1% level) indicating that firms with a high 
level of retained profits are more likely to increase the level of their dividends, as proposed 
by De Angelo et al. (2006). With regards to investors’ demands for dividend payment, our 
results using DP and IS as proxies for market sentiment are supportive of our earlier finding. 
The coefficient of dividend premium (DP) is positive (0.5748) and significant at the 5% 
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level, while the coefficient of sentiment index (IS) is negative (-1.6097) and significant at the 
10% level. This shows that firms cater for investors’ demands by increasing the cash 
dividends when the dividend premium is high and the prevailing market sentiment is low. In 
line with prior studies (Hoberg and Prabhala, 2009; Chay and Suh, 2009) we adopt three 
measures of risk (systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk and cash flow volatility). All coefficients 
indicate that risk can significantly explain firms’ dividend decisions as credibly as other 
explanations such as the firms’ life cycle and the catering hypothesis. On the contrary, the 
results using Model (2) indicate that firms’ maturity does not influence firms’ decisions to 
decrease dividend payments as both life cycle proxies are negative but insignificant in 
statistical terms. Furthermore, the catering incentive appears not to be related to the 
probability of dividend decrease with dividend premium being negatively associated with the 
dividend decrease (-0.8942, t-value of -1.4381). Firms’ decisions to cut down on dividend 
payments appear to be strongly related to the prevailing market sentiment with a coefficient 
of 1.0415 significant at the 1% level.  
Models (3) and (4) report the outcome of dividend initiation and dividend omission events. 
For the case of dividend initiation, the coefficients for the dividend premium and RE/TE 
ratios show that firms that do not pay dividends at t-1 are more likely to initiate dividend 
payment if they have a large amount of retained earnings in their capital base and when the 
dividend premium on payers is positive. Furthermore, the probability of initiating dividends 
is inversely related to the prevailing sentiment in the stock market (coefficient of -1.0012 
with a t-value of -2.1691) suggesting the possibility that dividends could possibly be used by 
corporate managers as a signal of financial health during down markets and to benefit from 
possible mispricing in the stock market. 
Finally, Model (4) reports the results in case of dividend omission. Our findings suggest that 
dividend payers are more likely to omit dividend payments when there is a decrease in the 
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dividend premium and when the prevailing market sentiment is positive. With regards to the 
firms’ life-cycle hypothesis, the coefficient of RE/TE is negative (-0.0038) and statistically 
significant at the 1% level (-2.9718) indicating that former payers with low levels of retained 
earnings are more inclined to cut down their cash dividends, compared to the rest of the firms 
in the market. 
 
5.4. Robustness checks  
We repeated the logistic regression for the propensity to distribute profits while controlling 
for various firm characteristics and risk. We examined whether all (i) dividend premium, (ii) 
stock liquidity, and (iii) investor sentiment can predict the propensity to distribute profits 
after controlling for risk. According to the study by Hoberg and Prabhala (2009), the risk is a 
significant factor in explaining firms’ propensity to distribute dividends to their shareholders. 
We estimate systematic risk by regressing daily stock returns for individual firms on market 
portfolio return (stock market index) using the standard deviation of the expected returns 
estimated by the market model as a measure for systematic risk. In addition, the idiosyncratic 
risk (unsystematic risk) is proxied using the standard deviation of the residuals value (
it ) 
from the previous regression.
19
  
Consistent with Hoberg and Prabhala (2009), we report that both systematic and 
idiosyncratic risks are negatively associated with the propensity to distribute profits in the 
MENA region. Table 10 reports these results in three panels (2000-2004, 2005-2009, and 
2010-2015 respectively). For all sub-periods, we find that the company size, its profitability, 
and the growth opportunities are all significant variables. The propensity to pay cash 
distributions (PTPCD) appears to be positively associated with company size and 
profitability, but negatively associated with growth opportunities. As in the previous results 
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 The standard deviation of the difference between individual stock’s returns and the expected returns derived 
from the market model. 
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from Table 7, the relationship between total debt ratio and cash ratio to the propensity to 
distribute profits are all insignificant across all different periods.  
In terms of the link between PTPCD and dividend premium after controlling for both 
firms’ micro-characteristics and risk, we find that the dividend premium still has significant 
explanatory power (1.145 significant at 5% level, 1.122 significant at 10% level and 1.395 
significant at 10% level in Panel A, B, and C respectively). The results for the cases of stock 
liquidity and market sentiment are also similar to the ones reported in Table 7. After 
controlling for both systematic and idiosyncratic risk, the coefficient for stock liquidity 
remains still positive and statistically insignificant; while, the link between investor sentiment 
and PTPCD appears to be positive and significant in statistical terms. These results are 
contradictory to the findings of Banerjee et al. (2007) in the US who showed that low 
liquidity firms are inclined to initiate dividends or continuing to distribute profits to their 
shareholders. Similarly, our evidence on the investor sentiment proxy is also contradictory to 
the findings of Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) that showed that the effect of a sentiment index 
on the changing propensity to distribute dividends is insignificant after controlling for risk.  
(Insert Table 10 about here) 
 
5.5. Investor sentiment and future abnormal returns 
We now conduct further tests to investigate whether or not the investor sentiment index can 
be used as a profitable investment strategy by examining future abnormal returns for both 
groups of stocks, dividend-payers and non-dividend payers. This is done by regressing future 
excess returns of the two groups of stocks for the periods t+1, t+2 and t+3(dependent 
variable) on the lagged investor sentiment index (independent variable) using a univariate 
regression model. This is mathematically formulated as  
1t t t itAR a bIS           (7) 
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where 𝐴𝑅𝑡 is the abnormal returns for each portfolio (dividend paying stocks and non-
dividend paying stocks), 𝐼𝑆𝑡−1 is the lagged sentiment index.  
 Table 11 presents the results of the univariate regression distinguished into two 
panels, the period subsequent to a positive investor sentiment (Panel A) and the period 
following a negative market sentiment (Panel B). According to Panel A, future abnormal 
returns for dividend-paying stocks increase by 3.54%, 5.35% and 6.71% respectively, while 
the opposite finding emerges for the case of non-payers with a coefficient of -5.1%, -6.38% 
and -5.75%.  Apart from the period t+2 for dividend-paying shares and t+1 for the non-
dividend paying shares, other results are significant at the 5% or the 1% level. The relative 
returns on a strategy that goes long on the dividend payers and short on the non-paying firms 
generate an excess profit of 8.66%, 11.54% and  12.23% for the first three years after 
portfolio formation. In terms of cumulative returns, this strategy can generate CARs of 
30.37% over these three years, a result which is significant at the 1% level. 
(Insert Table 11 about here) 
 An exact opposite picture is reported for the case of a negative market sentiment 
(sentiment<0). According to our results on Panel B, future excess returns for non-dividend 
payers increase by 4.23%, 3.91%, and 5.15% in the three years following portfolio formation. 
The portfolio of dividend payers reports an increasing abnormal loss of 5.19%, 6.05% and 
8.27% in the periods t+1, t+2 and t+3.  Finally, the difference in the average cumulative 
abnormal returns between these groups of firms is -28.43% but insignificant in statistical 
terms. These results are consistent with the evidence provided by extant studies in the US 
market (Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Baker and Wurgler, 2007). In a similar line, we can also 
conclude that during periods of positive market sentiment in the MENA region non-dividend 
paying stocks tend to earn relatively low abnormal returns compared to their dividend-paying 
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counterparts with the relative cumulative abnormal returns between the two groups of 
companies being positive. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This study investigates whether dividend premium, stock liquidity, and investor sentiment 
can explain firms’ propensity to distribute dividend payments in the MENA region. We 
propose a composite sentiment index that consists of five sentiment proxies (dividend 
premium, NIPOs, RIPOs, VP, market liquidity). Our results briefly indicate that the firms’ 
tendency to pay dividends increases during periods of negative market sentiment and 
especially after Arabic spring revolution in the period 2010-2015. Our results also provide 
support for the catering incentive by showing that firms in the MENA tend to satisfy 
investors’ desire for receiving cash distributions. In addition, the dividend premium appears 
to have significant predictive power in explaining the propensity to distribute profits in the 
MENA region. In detail, we find that stock liquidity has no significant explanatory power for 
firms’ tendency to distribute dividends, hence refuting the hypothesis that companies tend to 
use cash dividends as an alternate for liquidity in the equity market. Further robustness 
checks indicate that business risk is negatively associated with firms’ propensity to pay 
dividends. On the contrary, the composite sentiment index and the dividend premium are all 
had a positive effect on companies’ tendency to pay cash distributions with control for 
various firm micro-characteristics and risk. Last but not least, we test the relation between 
lagged sentiment index and future excess returns for both dividend- and non-dividend payers 
and report that the relative excess returns between the two groups are negatively associated 
with lagged market sentiment in the period of three years after portfolio formation.  
 Our findings are of interest to both finance academics and practitioners/investors in 
the MENA stock markets. According to conventional finance theory, investors' expectations 
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and preferences are characterized by relative homogeneity while the trading behaviour of 
individual investors cannot affect individual stock prices. Our findings on firms’ attitude on 
dividend policy in the MENA region do not support such assumptions. For example, we 
observe that investors in the Arab countries tend to prefer cash dividends during periods of 
the market downturn (where the prevailing sentiment is negative). This might be attributed to 
the tendency of those investors to seek financial safety during periods of recession. In terms 
of asset pricing, we show that both (i) the relative valuation of dividend-paying stocks 
(dividend premium) and (ii) the composite sentiment index are all significant explanatory 
factors of companies’ tendency to pay cash distributions, even after controlling for business 
risk. This finding implies that although risk is an influential factor in determining the intrinsic 
value of common shares, it is not the only variable that could explain changes in stock market 
returns. Moreover, in contrast to the standard view that dividend payments and market 
liquidity are considered to be substitutes (Banerjee et al., 2007 and Kuo et al., 2013), our 
results suggest that listed firms in the MENA region still pay cash dividends to their 
shareholders during periods of high market liquidity.  
 Our results on the relationship between dividend payments and stock excess returns 
under different periods of market sentiment suggest that MENA companies can adopt a 
market timing strategy and alternate their dividend policy depending on the wider market 
conditions. Hence, the best time for declaring cash dividends and/or increase the relevant 
dividend payments is that of a declining market. During periods of increase of investor 
sentiment firms could cut their cash dividends short, as according to our findings this will 
maximise the abnormal returns on their stock. This is attributed to the fact that investors in 
the MENA region appear to undervalue ‘safe’
20
 stocks in periods of positive market 
sentiment and vice versa. As such there are significant arbitrage profits to be made by 
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 Stocks of large-size firms which are more profitable in terms of earnings’ generation ability. 
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investors when trading against the prevailing sentiment by rebalancing their asset portfolios 
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Table 1. Sample characteristics by country 
Country N SZ PROF GO TDR CASR Payers% 
Bahrain 34 5.25 0.11 0.14 0.33 0.128 0.69 
Egypt 109 5.84 0.06 0.09 0.48 0.092 0.59 
Jordan 67 4.88 0.05 0.15 0.36 0.123 0.55 
Kuwait 65 5.16 0.09 0.12 0.32 0.145 0.61 
Morocco 45 4.96 0.07 0.11 0.42 0.104 0.39 
Oman 56 5.24 0.05 0.13 0.27 0.118 0.77 
Qatar 22 5.52 0.12 0.14 0.38 0.135 0.72 
Saudi Arabia 83 5.76 0.10 0.10 0.44 0.112 0.51 
Tunisia 35 4.35 0.03 0.08 0.42 0.089 0.48 
United Emirates 64 5.22 0.10 0.12 0.41 0.171 0.35 
Total Sample 580 5.21 0.08 0.11 0.38 0.121 0.56 
 
Notes: All control variables are based on the fiscal year. The firm size (SZ) is the log of the book value of the 
total assets; profitability (PROF) is defined as the earnings before interest and tax over the value of total assets;  
the growth opportunities (GO) is defined as the % change in the total asset between period t and t-1; the total 
debt ratio (TDR) is defined as the total debt over total assets; internal liquidity (CASR) is defined as the cash 
balance over the total assets (cash ratio). N is the number of companies and Payers%= the proportion of the 












Table 2. Summary Statistics for dividend- and non-dividend payers.  
Panel A: Dividend Payers 
Variables Obs. Mean Median S.D. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis Probability Jarque-Bera 
Firm Size 5072 6.55 6.02 1.21 3.08 9.37 0.04 2.92 0.005 2.20749 
Profitability 5072 0.10 0.09 0.06 -0.42 0.21 0.55 2.01 0.000 462.822 
Change in Assets 5072 0.18 0.14 0.44 -0.38 3.54 -0.34 3.05 0.022 98.2449 
Total Debt Ratio 5072 0.48 0.42 0.25 0.11 0.89 0.01 2.76 0.003 12.2566 
Cash Ratio 5072 0.16 0.13 0.32 0.01 0.21 0.52 3.11 0.001 251.814 
 
Panel B: Non-Dividend Payers 
Variables Obs. Mean Median S.D. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis Probability Jarque-Bera 
Firm Size 4208 5.29 5.14 0.13 3.22 9.37 0.11 2.78 0.000 16.9721 
Profitability 4208 0.06 0.05 0.17 -0.02 0.25 0.43 3.13 0.004 132.639 
Change in Assets 4208 0.23 0.21 0.89 -0.27 4.22 -0.05 2.59 0.019 31.2267 
Total Debt Ratio 4208 0.27 0.25 0.04 0.01 0.63 0.04 3.06 0.450 12.7533 
Cash Ratio 4208 0.14 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.27 0.02 3.42 0.143 31.2091 
 
Panel C: Test of Significance for Differences (Mann-Whitney test) 
Dividend Payers- Non-Payers                           Median         Z-stat 
Firm Size                                                                 0.88            2.88***                                                                             
Profitability                                                             0.04            2.32** 
Change in Assets                                                    -0.07           -2.01** 
Total Debt Ratio                                                      0.17            2.98*** 
Cash Ratio                                                               0.03            1.79*                                            
 







Table 3 Pearson correlation matrix 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) SZ 1.0000          
(2) PROF 0.0351 
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Notes: SZ= the firm size; PROF= the firm profitability; GO= the growth opportunities; TDR= the total debt ratio; CASR= Cash ratio; DP= the dividend premium; RE/TE = 
the retained earnings over total equity; TE/TA= total equity over total assets; S_TURNR= the stock turnover ratio, and IS= the composite sentiment index. *, **, and *** 
refer to 10%, 5% and 1% significant level, respectively.
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Table 4. The aggregate dividend premium across countries 2000-2015 


































































Notes: V-M/BE payers is the value-weighted market to book ratio for the dividend-payers; V-M/BE non-payers 



























Table 5. The propensity to distribute profits  
Year No of Firms Payers Actual PTP% Expected PTP% 𝑃𝑇𝑃 
2000 411 189 45.9 47.5 1.6 
2001 428 168 39.2 42.8 3.6 
2002 484 197 40.7 40.2 -0.5 
2003 495 176 35.5 34.8 -0.7 
2004 478 172 35.9 35.4 -0.5 
2005 524 255 48.6 46.7 -1.9 
2006 527 312 59.2 58.8 -0.4 
2007 552 321 58.1 59.4 1.3 
2008 576 343 59.5 57.9 -1.8 
2009 558 388 69.5 68.8 -0.7 
2010 571 357 62.5 63.2 0.7 
2011 546 324 59.3 59.9 0.6 
2012 513 360 70.1 70.3 0.2 
2013 574 382 66.5 67.5 1.0 
2014 560 397 70.1 71.3 1.2 
2015 545 402 73.7 75.0 1.7 
 
Notes: Actual PTP= the actual proportion of the dividend payers; Expected PTP= the expected proportion of the 
dividend payers; 𝑃𝑇𝑃= the propensity to distribute profits (the difference between the expected proportion and 
the actual proportion). 
47 
 
Table 6. The regression of the abnormal returns on composite sentiment index 




jtAR                                         15               -4.11             (0.00)***          0.31                   0.34 
nd
jtAR                                        15                5.34             (0.10)*              0.29                   0.28 
d nd




jtAR                                         15                3.12             (0.01)***           0.25                  0.27 
nd
jtAR                                        15              -2.56             (0.05)**             0.36                  0.39 
d nd
jt jtAR AR                           15                5.68             (0.03)**             0.33                  0.32 
 
Notes: N is number of years; 
d
jtAR is the abnormal returns for dividend payers; 
nd
jtAR is the abnormal 
returns for non-payers; 
d nd
jt jtAR AR is the relative abnormal returns between the both two groups of 

















Table 7. Logistic regression between the propensity to pay dividends, dividend premium, stock liquidity and investor sentiment                                     
                                
                                                              2000-2015                                        2000-2004                                           2005-2009                                              2010-2015         
 
Dividend premium (DP)                       1.952**                                             1.335*                                                 1.988*                                                   1.411**                           
                                                              [2.145]                                               [1.802]                                                [1.732]                                                   [2.089] 
Stock liquidity                                       0.342                                                 0.174                                                   0.516                                                     0.951 
                                                   [1.126]                                               [0.941]                                                [1.009]                                                   [1.162]                                                                                                                                          
Investor Sentiment (IS)                        -0.256*                                              -0.705**                                              -0.225*                                                  -0.168* 
                                                              [-1.911]                                              [-2.218]                                               [-1.819]                                                 [-1.743] 
Firm Size (SZ)                                       0.304***                                            0.771***                                             0.749***                                               0.268***      
                                                              [4.523]                                                [4.104]                                                [6.228]                                                  [3.201]                                                                               
Profitability (PROF)                            10.991**                                             11.721***                                           12.517**                                               12.103** 
                                                              [2.117]                                                [4.932]                                                [2.099]                                                   [2.257]          
Growth Opportunities (GO)                -0.095**                                              -0.074**                                             -0.275**                                                -0.254*          
                                                              [-2.117]                                               [-2.312]                                               [-2.197]                                                 [-1.954]       
Total debt ratio (TDR)                         -0.448                                                  -0.511                                                 -0.671                                                     -0.227                            
                                                              [-0.991]                                               [-1.326]                                               [-1.054]                                                 [-0.475] 
Cash ratio (CASR)                                0.671                                                    0.321                                                  0.149                                                      0.406            
                                                              [1.032]                                                [1.147]                                                [1.228]                                                   [1.007]          
Constant                                              -0.243**                                              -0.320**                                              -0.234                                                     -0.987  
                                                              [-2.039]                                               [-2.046]                                               [-2.234]                                                 [-0.755]          
  
Pseudo  𝑅2                                                  29.12%                                                 32.71%                                               25.19%                                                28.68% 
 
 
Notes: The firm size (SZ) is the log of the book value of the total assets; profitability (PROF) is defined as the earnings before interest and tax over the value of total assets;  
the growth opportunities (GO) is defined as the % change in the total asset between period t and t-1; the total debt ratio (TDR) is defined as the total debt over total assets; 
Cash ratio (CASR) is defined as the cash balance over the total assets (cash ratio); Dividend premium (DP) is the difference of the log of the average value-weighted market-
to-book ratio (M/BV) between companies that pay dividends and those that do not pay dividends; Stock liquidity is defined as stock turnover ratio (trading volume over 
number of outstanding shares); investor sentiment is a composite index of five sentiment proxies, which are dividend  premium, market liquidity, number of IPOs, first-day 
return on IPOs, volatility premium. T-statistics are in parentheses after clustering the standard errors for firms and years using procedures of Peterson (2009). *, **, and *** 








Table 8: Panel regression with fixed effect for time and country 
 
 
  Dependent Variable: Dividend Payout                                      Model (1)                                             Model (2) 
                                                                                          Coef                    T-stat                    Coef                    T-stat                    
Dividend Premium (DP)                                                2.8573                  1.8851*                 1.8132                2.0761** 
Investor Sentiment (IS)                                                 -0.7569                 -3.8972***           -0.3465               -2.1371**                                                                                                                  
Retained Earnings-to-Equity (RE/TE)                           0.0443                   1.8354*                0.0653                2.2526** 
Equity-to-Assets (TE/TA)                                              0.0531                   0.3847                  0.0508                0.0321 
Firm Size (SZ)                                                                0.2375                   5.8473***            0.4765                3.5746***                                            
Profitability (PROF)                                                      12.8570                 1.9473*               10.6470               2.0120**                                  
Growth Opportunities (GO)                                          -0.0832                 -1.7784*               -0.0685              -5.1154*** 
Total Debt Ratio (TDR)                                                 -0.6473                 -1.5642                 -0.7564              -1.1729         
Cash Ratio (CASR)                                                         0.8473                   1.6574                  0.3985                1.1123 
Cash Flow Volatility                                                     -0.3721**              -2.0364                -0.5742               -1.8694* 
Lagged Dividend Payout                                                0.8761                   2.8949***            0.4635                1.7866* 
                                                     Egypt                                                                                    0.4453                1.9632*                                                                         
                                                     Jordan                                                                                   0.2352                 2.2153** 
                                                     Kuwait                                                                                  1.1642                 1.8695* 
                                                     Morocco                                                                               0.7321                 3.9852*** 
                                                     Oman                                                                                    0.8574                 5.4631*** 
                                                     Qatar                                                                                     0.9685                 1.7958* 
                                                     Saudi Arabia                                                                         0.2913                 1.8946* 
                                                     Tunisia                                                                                  1.1473                 2.0231** 
                                                     United Emirates                                                                    0.3872                 1.5743 
                                                     2001                                                                                      0.8165                3.6531*** 
                                                     2002                                                                                      0.4632                1.7432* 
                                                     2003                                                                                      0.3421                1.2321 
                                                     2004                                                                                      1.4536                3.5647*** 
                                                     2005                                                                                      0.0382                1.8821* 
                                                     2006                                                                                      0.7659                4.3651*** 
                                                     2007                                                                                      0.2435                1.1857 
                                                     2008                                                                                      1.4536                2.1186** 
                                                     2009                                                                                      0.7437                1.8642* 
                                                     2010                                                                                      1.5784                3.1123*** 
                                                     2011                                                                                      0.8957                1.2543 
                                                     2012                                                                                      0.6451                1.0276 
                                                     2013                                                                                      0.4168                1.8764* 
                                                     2014                                                                                      0.9207                2.1982** 
                                                     2015                                                                                      0.5783                1.9182*             
Notes: This table reports the results on the relationship between the dividend payout ratio with the two main 
proxies for firm life-cycle (RE/TE, TE/TA) and the market sentiment (DP, IS). All dummy variables are 







Table 9: Likelihood of dividend changes, dividend initiations, and dividend omissions  
                                                               Model (1)                        Model (2)                           Model (3)                           Model (4) 
                                                          Dividend Increase        Dividend Decrease             Dividend Initiation            Dividend Omission 
 
 
Intercept                                           -3.4463***                       -1.4429**                          -2.7468***                         -2.1201** 
                                                         -4.3527]                             [-2.1186]                            [-5.4827]                            [-2.2513] 
DPt−1                                                 0.5748**                         -0.8942                                0.7214***                         -0.3821*    
                                                          [2.1345]                            [-1.4381]                            [3.0134]                             [-1.9512] 
ISt−1                                                 -1.6097*                            1.0415***                         -1.0012**                             1.8155               
                                                         [-1.7811]                            [3.0012]                             [-2.1691]                            [1.4112]                                             
RE/TEit                                             0.0392***                        -0.0017                                0.0109*                              -0.0038*** 
                                                         [6.4672]                             [-1.6219]                             [1.9138]                             [-2.9718] 
TE/TAit                                             0.7484                              -0.2769                                0.07621                              -0.2918 
                                                         [0.8903]                            [-1.4351]                              [0.3501]                             [-1.5611] 
SZ                                                    1.8755***                         -1.3874***                          1.2837**                            -1.4726* 
                                                         [5.4932]                            [-3.2914]                              [2.1276]                             [-1.7915]           
PROF                                               0.1902***                        -0.0486***                           0.02357*                            -0.0281** 
                                                         [4.2718]                            [-6.7501]                              [1.7891]                             [-2.1432]      
GO                                                  -0.0532**                          -0.0127                                -0.03756**                           -0.0165 
                                                         [-2.0462]                           [-0.3351]                             [-2.2199]                             [0.3521] 
TDR                                                -0.0237                              -0.8742                                -0.9283                                -0.4561 
                                                         [-1.6542]                           [-1.4591]                             [-1.1273]                             [-0.7642] 
CASR                                               0.0028                              -0.0384                                 0.0012                                -0.0376 
                                                         [1.1103]                            [-0.6291]                             [1.5342]                               [-1.2137]    
Div𝑖𝑡−1                                             -0.0387                               0.1763**                                                                         0.1253* 
                                                          [-1.4117]                          [2.2435]                                                                           [1.9051]   
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡                                           -0.9583***                        -0.4631***                         -0.7482**                            -1.6431*** 
                                                         [-4.3657]                            [-7.1182]                            [-2.1431]                              [-3.5401]                                
Systematic Risk                              -1.8601*                            -4.8671***                         -5.0116**                             -1.8845** 
                                                         [-1.9143]                            [-3.9512]                            [-2.2991]                              [-2.1743] 
Idiosyncratic Risk                          -12.7966***                       -2.6601**                           -6.2617*                               -18.9311** 
                                                         [-3.5611]                            [-2.1013]                            [-1.8793]                              [-2.2214]   
Observations                                        1931                                 1482                                    928                                         770 
 
Pseudo 𝑅 2                                          23.17%                            21.86%                             24.03%                                    29.38% 
 
 
Notes: This table reports the results of a panel logistic regression analysis for the cases of dividend increases 
(Model 1), decreases (Model 2), initiations (Model 3) and omissions (Model 4). Dividend premium (DPt-1) is the 
lagged dividend premium; 𝐼𝑆𝑡−1 is the lagged investor sentiment index;  𝑅𝐸/𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡  is the ratio of retained earnings 
over total equity; 𝑇𝐸/𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the ratio of total equity over total assets; firm size (SZ) is the log of the book value 
of the total assets; profitability (PROF) is defined as the earnings before interest and tax over the value of total 
assets;  the growth opportunities (GO) is defined as the % change in the total asset between period t and t-1; the 
total debt ratio (TDR) is defined as the total debt over total assets; cash ratio (CASR) is defined as the cash 
balance over the total assets (cash ratio); 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡−1 is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the firm paid 
dividends in the last year and 0 otherwise, 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 is the standard deviation of the operating profits ratio and 
a proxy for cash flow volatility. T-statistics are in parentheses after clustering the standard errors for firms and 










Table 10. The propensity to distribute profits with control for firms’ micro characteristics and business risk 
 
Regressions                                                 Firm characteristics                                     𝐷𝑃𝑡−1       𝑆𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡−1           𝐼𝑆𝑡−1                                       Risk       
                           SZ              PROF                GO               TDR               CASR                                                                                  Systematic                   Idiosyncratic 
                  Panel A: 2000-2004 
 
Model 1        0.421***       12.121***        -0.071**        -0.412             0.210              
                     (4.237)           (6.984)             (-2.154)          (-1.354)          (0.986) 
Model 2        0.534***       10.123***        - 0.210*         -0.523             0.112             1.145**                                                            -34.120*                      -23.105* 
                     (11.432)         (7.432)             (-1.789)          (-0.857)          (1.231)          (2.139)                                                              (-1.983)                        (-1.872)     
Model 3        0.342***       11.345***        -0.256**        -0.544             0.123                                    0.021                                         -45.230*                      -36.150* 
                     (8.236)           (5.463)             (-2.281)          (-0.167)          (0.843)                                 (0.193)                                       (-1.894)                        (-1.763) 
Model 4        0.423***       12.001***        -0.234*          -0.505             0.237                                                           -0.112*               -24.123*                      -14.172* 
                     (4.872)           (7.150)             (-1.707)          (-1.123)          (0.912)                                                        (-1.901)               (-1.861)                       (-1.770) 
  
Panel B: 2005-2009 
Model 1        0.465***       11.134**         -0.034**         -0.321             0.115              
                     (6.584)           (2.053)             (-2.112)          (-1.423)          (0.569) 
 
Model 2        0.507***       10.851**         -0.312***        -0.645            0.324             1.122*                                                                -31.161                       -21.190 
                     (5.321)           (2.224)             (-6.722)          (-1.129)          (1.213)          (1.721)                                                               (-1.002)                       (-1.201)     
Model 3        0.214***       11.576*           -0.342*            -0.589            0.541                                    0.031                                           -25.030                       -37.152** 
                     (7.533)           (1.765)             (-1.980)          (-1.326)          (1.237)                                 (1.508)                                        (-1.440)                       (-1.213) 
Model 4        0.411***       12.355***       -0.225**           -0.805           0.213                                                           -0.212*                -14.081                        -16.351* 
                     (4.532)           (7.113)             (-2.217)          (-1.115)          (1.428)                                                        (-1.974)                (-1.532)                       (-1.765) 
 
Panel C: 2010-2015 
Model 1       0.435***       11.177*            -0.081*            -0.423            0.287              
                    (5.325)           (1.762)              (-1.891)          (-0.895)          (1.321) 
Model 2       0.512***       10.880**          - 0.245*           -0.535            0.114             1.395**                                                             -38.340                        -27.183* 
                    (3.312)           (1.710)              (-1.802)          (-1.572)          (1.276)          (2.214)                                                               (-1.115)                      (-1.901)     
Model 3       0.448**         11.422**          -0.229**          -0.514            0.123                                    0.089                                          -40.731                        -31.187** 
                    (2.171)           (2.001)              (-2.221)          (-1.433)          (1.008)                                 (0.002)                                        (-0.987)                      (-2.301) 
Model 4       0.489***       12.456*            -0.214**          -0.515            0.205                                                           -0.134*                -28.541*                     -16.320* 
                    (5.328)           (1.702)              (-2.063)          (-1.021)          (0.894)                                                        (1.802)                 (-1.951)                      (-1.771) 
 
Notes: *, **, and *** refer to 10%, 5% and 1% significant level, respectively. 
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Table 11. Future excess returns and investor sentiment index 
 
  
                                           N            coef               P-Value                 𝑅2             adj 𝑅2            
Panel A: Investor sentiment>0 
 
Dividend- payers returns 
𝑟𝐷𝑡+1                                   14           0.0354          (0.0000)***          0.1815       0.2158 
𝑟𝐷𝑡+2                                   13           0.0535          (0.7401)                0.3412       0.3094               
𝑟𝐷𝑡+3                                   12           0.0671          (0.0612)**            0.2336       0.2614 
𝑅𝐷𝑡+3                                  12           0.1436          (0.0130)***          0.2912       0.3178 
 
Non-payers returns 
𝑟𝑁𝐷𝑡+1                                 14          -0.0512         (0.5208)                0.0536       0.0402 
𝑟𝑁𝐷𝑡+2                                 13          -0.0638         (0.0026)***          0.1201       0.1383 
𝑟𝑁𝐷𝑡+3                                 12          -0.0575         (0.0213)**            0.3864       0.3711 
𝑅𝑁𝐷𝑡+3                                12          -0.1709         (0.0000)***          0.3105       0.3572 
 
Relative returns 
𝑟𝐷𝑡+1 − 𝑟𝑁𝐷𝑡+1                    14           0.0866        (0.0110)***          0.3711       0.3404 
𝑟𝐷𝑡+2 − 𝑟𝑁𝐷𝑡+2                    13           0.1154        (0.0345)**            0.1925       0.2276 
𝑟𝐷𝑡+3 − 𝑟𝑁𝐷𝑡+3                    12           0.1223        (0.6598)                0.5386       0.4912 
𝑅𝐷𝑡+3 − 𝑅𝑁𝐷𝑡+3                  12           0.3037        (0.0430)**            0.4102       0.3875 
 
Panel B: Investor sentiment<0 
 
Dividend-payers returns 
𝑟𝐷𝑡+1                                    14           -0.0519        (0.8432)                0.2132      0.2370 
𝑟𝐷𝑡+2                                    13           -0.0605        (0.0000)***          0.2706      0.2834 
𝑟𝐷𝑡+3                                    12           -0.0827        (0.0105)***          0.1518      0.1791 
𝑅𝐷𝑡+3                                   12           -0.1646        (0.0711)*              0.3523      0.3422 
 
Non-payers returns 
𝑟𝑁𝐷𝑡+1                                  14            0.0423        (0.0152)***          0.1804      0.1983 
𝑟𝑁𝐷𝑡+2                                  13            0.0391        (0.0975)*              0.1472      0.1612 
𝑟𝑁𝐷𝑡+3                                  12            0.0512        (0.0615)**            0.2913      0.2517 
𝑅𝑁𝐷𝑡+3                                 12            0.1328        (0.0000)***          0.3301      0.3294 
 
Relative returns 
𝑟𝐷𝑡+1 − 𝑟𝑁𝐷𝑡+1                     14          -0.0942        (0.0385)**            0.2422      0.2142 
𝑟𝐷𝑡+2 − 𝑟𝑁𝐷𝑡+2                     13          -0.0996        (0.0100)***          0.1191      0.1439 
𝑟𝐷𝑡+3 − 𝑟𝑁𝐷𝑡+3                     12          -0.1339        (0.0543)**            0.3901      0.4100 
𝑅𝐷𝑡+3 − 𝑅𝑁𝐷𝑡+3                   12          -0.2843        (0.5367)                0.4286      0.3832                  
 
Notes: This table reports excess returns of dividend-payers and non-dividend payers on the lagged 
investor sentiment. The dependent variables are the dividend payer returns 𝑟𝐷 in t+1, t+2, t+3, the non-
payer returns   𝑟𝑁𝐷  in t+1, t+2, t+3, and the relative returns between payers and non-payers 𝑟𝐷 −  𝑟𝑁𝐷 
in t+1, t+2, t+3 and the cumulative returns 𝑅𝐷𝑡, 𝑅𝑁𝐷𝑡 , 𝑅𝐷𝑡 − 𝑅𝑁𝐷𝑡 from t+1 through t+3.  








Appendix A: Variables definition and expected relationships.  
Variables The ratios 






The propensity to pay 
dividends 
 
PTP= is binary variable equal 1 if the firm pays dividends and 
zero otherwise 
 
Dividend payout ratio Total dividends over operating profits 
The probability of  
dividend initiation 
A binary variable equal 1 if the firm pays the initial dividends in 
year i and zero otherwise. 
The probability of dividend 
omission 
A binary variable equal 1 if the firm that already paid a cash 
dividend in the prior year is decided to omit the cash dividend in 
year t and zero otherwise. 
The probability of dividend 
change  
1) Probability of dividend increase= is a binary variable equal 
1 in case of dividend increase and zero otherwise 
2) Probability of dividend decrease =is a binary variable equal 




Firm size Logarithm of the total assets + 
Profitability 
Earnings before interest and taxes over the 




Change in the total assets between the current 
year and the previous year 
 
- 
Total debt ratio Total debts over the total assets - 
Cash ratio Cash balance over the total assets + 
Dividend premium 
Log difference between the value-weighted 





Stock turnover ratio estimated as the number 
of traded stocks(trading volume) over the 




1) RE/TE = is the retained earnings over 
total equity 
2) TE/TA= is the total equity over total 
assets 
+/- 
Cash flow volatility 
The standard deviation of operating profits 
ratio 
- 
Composite sentiment index  




1) Systematic risk 
 
 
2) Idiosyncratic risk  
 
The standard deviation of the predicted values 
from the regression between daily excess 
stock returns and market returns. 
 
The standard deviations of the residuals from 














































































































































































































































































Figure 3. The propensity to pay dividends, dividend premium and investors’ sentiment 
index 
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